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ARBITRABILITY AND VULNERABILITY
by CAROLYN L. DESSIN*
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is cool.1 Everybody‟s doing it. In the eighty-five years since the
passage of the Federal Arbitration Act, 2 that seems to be the prevailing sentiment.
Recent decades have seen the meteoric rise of arbitration as a form of alternative
dispute resolution.3 Arbitration is widely regarded as a less expensive, more
expeditious alternative to litigation.
Courts frequently note that federal policy clearly favors arbitration. 4 No
judicial enthusiasm for arbitration seems more complete than that evidenced in the
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. 5
Along with the rise of arbitration, however, there has also been a rise in the
amount of criticism of arbitration.6 Some suggest that nothing short of a complete
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. J.D., Magna cum Laude, Villanova
University School of Law; M.M., Westminster Choir College; B.M. Ed., Temple University. The author
thanks the University of Akron School of Law for a research grant that supported the writing of this
article.
1. Arbitration is:
An agreement between two or more persons to submit an existing or future dispute to third
persons (arbitrators) who are chosen by the parties. The power of the arbitrators to act
depends upon the scope of the agreement. This is the core value of private autonomy, for
without an agreement there is no duty to arbitrate.
Richard E. Speidel, Common Legal Issues in American Arbitration Law, in ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA 31 (Edward Brunet et al. eds., 2006) (internal citations omitted).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
3. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1636 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration] (discussing the increase of
mandatory arbitration); Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a
Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 17 (2003) [hereinafter Sternlight, Rise and Spread]
(discussing the increase of mandatory arbitration).
4. See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir.
1982) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)); Ultracashmere
House Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (11th Cir. 1981); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Nat‟l Rail
Passenger Corp., 554 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1977); J. S. & H. Constr. Co. v. Rich. Cnty. Hosp. Auth.,
473 F.2d 212, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1973).
5. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, “Arbitracide”: The Story of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in the U.S.
Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT‟L ARB. 233, 233-38 (2007) (“For more than forty years, the U.S. Supreme
Court has touted the recourse to arbitration . . . . With the exception of an isolated case, the judicial
doctrine on arbitration constantly endeavors to achieve the enforcement of arbitral agreements and
awards and thereby erect and maintain a de facto, albeit functional, private process for the adjudication
of civil disputes.” (footnotes omitted)).
6. Compare David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set It Free: How “Mandatory”
Undermines “Arbitration,” 8 NEV. L.J. 400, 401 (2007) (criticizing the Supreme Court‟s interpretation
of the Federal Arbitration Act because it has resulted in two “fundamental errors” that, one, state law is
preempted and, two, that “stronger parties in regulated transactions [are allowed] to compel arbitration
[349]
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overhaul of the Federal Arbitration Act will correct problems that have arisen in the
arbitration context.7
One of the main focuses of the criticism has been against mandatory binding
pre-dispute arbitration in the consumer context. 8 The United States has condoned
this species of arbitration in an unparalled fashion, and some suggest that our
country has gone too far.9 One of the major concerns in this area is that it is
unlikely that a consumer can knowingly agree to arbitrate claims that have not yet
arisen.10
This Article focuses on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the
context of a situation involving a vulnerable party. As the discussion will illustrate,
there is no precise definition of vulnerability. Although most of the cases discussed
herein involve older vulnerable adults, the concerns in this area frequently arise in
other contexts as well. Thus, the author suggests that the discomfort exhibited by
courts in dealing with these cases may suggest a broader discomfort with
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the consumer context.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
When the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925, most commentators
agree that Congress was not contemplating arbitration agreements involving
consumers.11 In fact, the rare comments in the legislative history suggest the
as a condition of doing business”), and Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration
(If Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82, 82 (2007) (“I drafted an article arguing on policy grounds
that companies ought not to be able to deprive „little guys‟ of the opportunity to litigate their disputes.”),
with, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness
Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 267-68 (2008) (suggesting that a legislative proposal to ban
more predispute arbitration clauses between individuals and companies would only benefit “trial
lawyers” and would make it harder to get an attorney, would drive up the cost of resolving disputes, and
would delay the time it takes to get relief).
7. E.g., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 1.
8. Cf. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 398-400 (2009) (noting that thinkers on the left find problems with the equity of
“„adhesionary‟ or „disparate-party‟ arbitration” in consumer and other transactions because they are
contracts “imposed unilaterally by the stronger party upon the weaker party on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis” and that thinkers on the right also find problems with the equity of such mandatory arbitration
because “[c]oerced agreements are not consensual undertakings”). In response to the possibility of
sweeping prohibition of consumer pre-dispute arbitration provisions, Professor Carbonneau states: “The
nullification of arbitration agreements in entire transactional areas is a radical and costly solution to the
problem of coerced acquiescence to, or participation in, arbitration.” Id. at 401.
9. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law?:
Lessons from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 570-71 (2007) (summarizing that critics of the
alternative dispute resolution boom in the United States since the 1970s argue that ADR in the private
setting does not serve the same functions of the “elaboration of law,” public accountability, education,
protecting the legal positions of weaker members of society, including women, and preventing
prejudices from influencing the resolution of conflicts).
10. Cf. Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute
[Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1078 (1998) (explaining that in
the employment context, if an employee agrees to arbitrate all claims “arising out of or related to” an
employment contract, the employee is understood to have agreed to the breadth of the agreement
because he or she otherwise would have bargained to exclude claims from the agreement to arbitrate).
11. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
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framing legislators viewed such a use of arbitration as inappropriate.12
The Federal Arbitration Act is extremely broad in its scope. It provides:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract . . . or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract . . . or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 13

Thus, the Federal Arbitration Act clearly allows binding pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.14 Whatever one thinks of such agreements, there is a
statutory basis for enforcement in the Federal Arbitration Act.
After the parties enter into an arbitration agreement, disputes are to be
resolved in accordance with the agreement. If a dispute arises, and the agreement
calls for arbitrating that type of dispute, the party who desires arbitration will often
file a motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation if the other party begins a
litigation proceeding. To determine the merits of the motion to compel arbitration,
the court first must determine whether the dispute is one that the parties intended to
arbitrate.15 Doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitration. 16 If the court
determines that the claim is within the purview of the arbitration agreement, the
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 78 (1997) (“If the
FAA was intended to have a direct impact on constituencies other than the business community—such
as consumers, or employees—one would expect some effort on the part of the Act‟s proponents to
convince such groups about how they too would benefit from enforcement of arbitration agreements.
But virtually nothing of the sort appears in the legislative history or supporting commentary. On the
contrary, these sources make abundantly clear that the FAA was an act by and for the business
community to regulate relationships among its members.”).
12. Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at
127. Professor Sternlight notes “when one Senator voiced a concern that arbitration contracts might be
„offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees,‟ the Senator was reassured by
the bill‟s supporters that they did not intend for the bill to cover such situations.” Id. at 127-28 (citing
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing
Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration:
Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 10
(1923) (statement of Sen. Walsh, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary))).
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
14. For an interesting divergence of views on Congress‟s intent in passing the Federal Arbitration
Act, compare IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 116-17 (1992) (recounting that the
American Bar Association (ABA) initially proposed the legislation and that it was the intent of both the
ABA and of Congress that the Act was not to “create substantive federal regulatory law superseding
state law”), with Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 163-65, 167 (2002) (arguing that the
legislative history, while ambiguous, shows that Congress did not intend for the Act to apply only in
federal court and that, in light of that history, there is less reason to amend the Act “to limit the
enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements”).
15. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
16. See Moses H. Cone Mem‟l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(reasoning that the Federal Arbitration Act establishes that any doubts about the scope of what can be
arbitrated should be decided in favor of arbitration).
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court must then decide “whether legal constraints external to the parties‟ agreement
foreclosed the arbitration of those claims.” 17
Following the lead of the Supreme Court, courts in the United States have
overwhelmingly decided cases in favor of arbitrability.18 Because the arbitration is
based on a federal statute, the courts have little choice in the matter.
Furthermore, the preemption doctrine limits the states‟ ability to enact limits
on arbitrability.19 Two results seem to flow from this fact. First, any limitation to
arbitrability will most likely have to be implemented at the federal level. Second,
state courts that are displeased with the results caused by a broad interpretation of
arbitrability may be inclined to find other ways to undermine seemingly
enforceable arbitration clauses.20
The contours of Federal Arbitration Act preemption have been addressed by
the Supreme Court. In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University,21 the Supreme Court considered the extent of
preemption. The Court noted that the federal act preempts state law only when state
law conflicts with the federal act‟s purpose of enforcing mutually agreed arbitration
clauses.22 Over the years, the Supreme Court has consistently struck down state
attempts to curtail arbitration.23
The debate in recent years about the desirability of binding pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in the consumer context has become increasingly intense
and the rhetoric has become increasingly vitriolic.24 Although this Article will not
undertake a comprehensive review of the discourse, some discussion of the
discourse is necessary to address the issue at hand.25
Along with the increase in debate, various legislators have introduced
legislation designed to curtail arbitrability. For example, in 2009, Representative
Hank Johnson re-introduced the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009.26 That Act would

17. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
18. See generally Alan Scott Rau, “The Arbitrability Question Itself,” 10 AM. REV. INT‟L ARB. 287
(1999) (thoroughly discussing the arbitrability question, including an interesting treatment of the
question of whether the arbitrator or the court decides the arbitrability question and discussing the
favorable treatment of arbitrability in courts).
19. See generally David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation:
The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Winter/Spring
2004) (providing an extensive and thoughtful critique of preemption in the arbitration context).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 31-90 (discussing how courts have dealt with these matters).
21. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
22. Id. at 477-78.
23. See Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 233 (noting that the Supreme Court “has protected arbitration
from inhospitable state regulation”).
24. E.g., id. at 249. Professor Carbonneau discusses the Arbitration Fairness Act by saying:
The legislative critique mouths the criticism of arbitration advanced by the ATLA.
Regardless of how justice is defined, arbitration undeniably depreciates the business
interest, adversarial skills, and the professional necessity of ATLA members by creating a
more effective and efficient civil dispute resolution process. Eliminating the option for
arbitration is equivalent to relegating American citizens to the emergency room for their
health care needs.
Id.
25. For a more thorough examination of the historical development of and difficulties arising in
regulating consumer arbitration, see Sternlight, supra note 12.
26. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
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prohibit binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements in most consumer settings. 27
Similarly, Representative Linda Sánchez and Senator Mel Martinez re-introduced
the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009.28 The Nursing Home Bill
would prohibit binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements in nursing home entrance
contracts.29
Not surprisingly, much of the reform sentiment is encouraged by organizations
of trial lawyers like the American Association for Justice, which is the organization
formerly known as the American Trial Lawyers Association. 30 Self-interest alone,
however, does not seem to explain the increasing calls for change in the law
regarding binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the consumer context.
II. RECENT CASELAW INVOLVING MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND A VULNERABLE PARTY
A. Who is vulnerable?
Presumably, any discussion of caselaw involving vulnerable parties should
begin with a definition of vulnerability. There is, however, no generally agreed
upon definition of vulnerability.
The core concept in a definition of vulnerability is the idea that “one is
incapable of protecting himself or herself from the overreaching acts of
unscrupulous people.”31 Inherent in this are two related concepts.32 First, the
individual may have a weakened capacity to “resist the influence of others.”33
Second, the individual may have a deficit in the ability to understand when another
person might be attempting to take advantage. 34
In defining vulnerability, many states have used age as a proxy for
vulnerability. Consider, for example, the definition of “vulnerable” in the Michigan
protective services statute: “„Vulnerable‟ means a condition in which an adult is
unable to protect himself or herself from abuse, neglect, or exploitation because of
a mental or physical impairment or because of advanced age.”35 Other states have
adopted similar definitions.
Arguably, a definition of vulnerability based on attainment of a certain age or
on age alone is the result of ageist stereotyping. Vulnerability comes from deficits
in cognition or ability, not from attainment of an age. Although many people
27. Id.
28. H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. (2009) and S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009). Representative Linda Sánchez
and Senators Mel Martinez and Herb Kohl introduced the bill to the House and Senate on February 26
and March 3, 2009, respectively. The bills have been referred to committee in both the House and
Senate.
29. H.R. 1237.
30. See, e.g., Most Vulnerable Americans Protected by Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act,
AM. ASS‟N FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/7799.htm
(advocating in favor of the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act and its provisions).
31. Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Is the Solution a Problem?, 34 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 267, 308 (2003).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Mich. Comp. Laws. § 400.11(f) (2008) (emphasis added).
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associate the aging process with an inevitable lessening of cognition and ability, the
reality is much more encouraging. 36 In fact, studies have repeatedly shown that the
percentage of older people who suffer from mental deficits serious enough to
interfere with the activities of daily living is actually fairly small. 37
To further complicate attempts to craft a meaningful definition, vulnerability
can be situational. An individual may be vulnerable to physical attacks, but fully
capable of protecting himself against financial scams.
For purposes of considering the issue at hand, the focus should be on a
definition of vulnerability that centers on three attributes. First, is the individual so
impaired that he or she cannot form the requisite mental intent to execute an
agreement to arbitrate? Second, is the individual impaired in a way that will
prevent him or her from participating in the arbitral process? Third, does the
situation suggest vulnerability?
With respect to the first attribute, it is clear that one must have the capacity to
enter an agreement to arbitrate. Without agreement, there is no duty to arbitrate. 38
Courts have used the capacity to contract standard when assessing this type of
issue. Traditionally, courts have held that a person lacks capacity to contract when
he or she cannot understand the terms of the agreement on the table. 39 This is a
well-established and, for the most part, readily applied rule of law.
With respect to the second attribute, there has been little discussion of the
effect that impairment of one of the parties has on the arbitral process. The same is
true for the third attribute, although in reviewing the caselaw, one can infer that
courts are uncomfortable enforcing arbitration agreements in some circumstances.
B. Examples of Caselaw Involving Vulnerable Parties
1. Nursing Home Entrance Agreements
Arguably, an arbitration clause contained in an agreement between a nursing
home and a resident provides the best example of a consumer-entity arbitration
agreement with a vulnerable party on one side. It is difficult to imagine a time
when an individual would be more vulnerable than when one is in such need of
skilled care that the individual is required to enter a nursing home.

36. See, e.g., H.B. GIBSON, THE EMOTIONAL AND SEXUAL LIVES OF OLDER PEOPLE: A MANUAL
PROFESSIONALS 55 (1992) (suggesting that the model of aging as deterioration is false); Marie R.
Haug & Marcia G. Ory, Issues in Elderly Patient-Provider Interactions, 9 RES. ON AGING 3, 6 (1987)
(suggesting that many medical students believe negative stereotypes about geriatric patients‟ health).
37. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, LOSING A MILLION MINDS: CONFRONTING THE
TRAGEDY OF ALZHEIMER‟S DISEASE AND OTHER DEMENTIAS 16 tbl.1-4 (1987) (noting that
approximately one percent of persons aged 65-74, seven percent of persons aged 75-84 and twenty-five
percent of those 85 or older suffer from dementia).
38. See, e.g., Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 350 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he essence of
arbitration, we think, is that, when the parties agree to submit their disputes to it, they have agreed to
arbitrate these disputes through to completion . . . .”).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §15(1) (“A person incurs only voidable
contractual duties by entering into a transaction if by reason of mental illness or defect . . . he is unable
to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction, or . . . he is unable
to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of his
condition.”).
FOR
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As a preliminary matter in considering this type of case, it may be important to
remember that nursing home litigation is a lucrative and growing area of legal
practice.40 Those who are distrustful about plaintiff-side attorneys‟ motives may
suggest that the growing number of challenges to mandatory arbitration in this area
is more about greed than about protecting the vulnerable, but that debate is outside
the scope of this article.
In February and March 2009, members of Congress re-introduced the Fairness
in Nursing Home Arbitration bill.41 The bills were referred to Committee, and
seemingly no further action has been taken. The bills would seriously curtail the
use of binding arbitration clauses in nursing home entrance agreements.
Creative attorneys have tried a number of different approaches to avoiding
arbitration clauses included in nursing home entrance contracts. If the clause can be
avoided, plaintiffs can resort to litigation to resolve disputes.
As discussed in the previous section, one could challenge enforceability of the
clause based on the incapacity of the nursing home resident. There are several
problems with this approach. First, the resident is often not the one signing the
agreement. If a spouse or adult child of the resident signs the agreement,
competency is usually not an issue. Second, even if the resident signs and is
arguably incompetent, the contract is voidable, not void. 42 Presumably, one acting
on behalf of the resident could avoid the contract, but that issue would need to be
addressed. Finally, the resident or his representative might not wish to arbitrate, but
might also not want to avoid the entire contract. Obviously, this problem will not
arise in a wrongful death action but could arise in other contexts such as a suit for
injury caused by the nursing home.
2. Durable Powers of Attorney
Sometimes, one who does not wish to be bound by an arbitration clause will
argue that a signature by an agent on an agreement to arbitrate cannot bind the
principal or those whose claims are based on rights of the principal. Although this
argument frequently arises in the nursing home agreement context, it can also arise
in other contexts.
Under traditional agency law, an agent can perform any act that his principal
empowers him to perform. 43 In the modern estate planning context, most powers of
attorney are durable powers of attorney.44 A durable power is one that is intended to
be effective even if the principal becomes incompetent. 45
40. See, e.g., David G. Stevenson & David M. Studdert, The Rise of Nursing Home Litigation:
Findings from a National Survey of Attorneys, 22-2 HEALTH AFF. 219 (March/April 2003) (noting the
rapid growth of nursing home litigation in recent years).
41. H.R. 1237; S. 512.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (1981) (noting that contracts entered into by
people with mental illness are “voidable”).
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006) (“An agent acts with actual authority
when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably
believes . . . that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”).
44. See, e.g., Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent under a Financial Durable Power of Attorney: An
Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574, 575 (1996) (noting that such powers of attorney have become
“extremely popular”).
45. Before the enactment of statutes allowing durability, a power of attorney would become
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The breadth of possible authority in an agent coupled with the notion of
durability would seem to suggest that an agent could consent to arbitration even on
behalf of a vulnerable, incompetent adult. Why then have some courts expressed an
unwillingness to allow agents to consent to arbitration on behalf of their principals?
3. Trust Disputes
In the event that a trustee breaches a fiduciary duty owed to a trust beneficiary,
the beneficiary can bring an action against the trustee. Not surprisingly, corporate
trustees have begun to seek the inclusion of binding arbitration clauses in
agreements of trust. This section focuses on the responses of American courts to
arbitration clauses in trust instruments. 46
When faced with binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses, most courts have
upheld the agreements and enforced the arbitration clause.
Commentators have considered the benefits and detriments of alternative
dispute resolution in the trust and probate area.47
a. Trust Beneficiary vs. Trustee
In a recent Texas case, the Court of Appeals refused to compel arbitration. In
Citizens National Bank v. Bryce,48 the court considered a case involving a suit by a
trust beneficiary and the executor of the settlor‟s estate against a trustee for
misappropriation and mismanagement. 49 The case is somewhat unusual in that the
arbitration clause was contained in a partnership agreement that the Bank signed as
trustee.50 Nevertheless, the underlying dispute was a suit by a trust beneficiary
against a trustee for breach of fiduciary.
Relying on the fact that the trustee had engaged in discovery for twenty
months after the suit was filed, the trial court concluded that the trustee had waived
any right it had to compel arbitration. The trial court thus denied the trustee‟s
motion to compel arbitration and the Court of Appeals affirmed.51
The Court of Appeals reasoned that “[a] party implicitly waives its arbitration
rights when it substantially invokes the judicial process to the other party‟s

ineffective upon the incompetence of the principal. Id. at 576.
46. The issue of arbitration in the trust contract is starting to emerge as an international issue as
well. See Tina Wüstemann, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 33, 34-35 (Christoph Müller ed., 2007) (noting discussion of trust disputes
in foreign jurisdictions).
47. See, e.g., Ray D. Madoff, Mediating Probate Disputes: A Study of Court Sponsored Programs,
38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 719-20 (2004) (discussing ways to overcome skepticism about
mediation among lawyers); Susan N. Gary, Mediating Probate Disputes, 13 PROB. & PROP. 11, 12-14
(1999) (noting the potential benefits and drawbacks of mediation); Roselyn L. Friedman & Erica E.
Lord, Using Facilitative Mediation in a Changing Estate Planning Practice, 32 EST. PLAN. 15, 18-20
(2005) (noting that mediation is “well-suited” to disputes involving trusts and estates); Robert N. Sacks,
Mediation: An Effective Method to Resolve Estate and Trust Disputes, 27 EST. PLAN. 210, 211 (2000)
(noting that courts are increasingly supporting mediation as a means of resolving trusts and estates
disputes).
48. 271 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. App. 2008).
49. Id. at 351.
50. Id. at 352.
51. Id. at 359.

Spring 2012]

ARBITRABILITY AND VULNERABILITY

357

detriment or prejudice.”52 Examining the length and extent of discovery, the Court
of Appeals held that the trustee had, indeed, invoked the judicial process to the
extent that it waived any right to compel arbitration. 53
The Florida legislature addressed this issue by enacting legislation that
attempts to require courts to enforce arbitration agreements found in trusts. 54 Not
surprisingly, some see such legislation as serving many salutary purposes. 55
b. Trust Beneficiary vs. Party with Whom Trustee Contracted
Sometimes, the attempt to arbitrate will be made by someone other than the
trustee of the trust. These cases usually arise out of a contract between the trustee
and a third party, i.e., one outside the trust. 56 Frequently, as part of seeking
assistance with assets management, the trustee will contract with a financial
services company. These contracts often include mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses. If a beneficiary becomes dissatisfied with the financial performance of the
trust, the beneficiary may sue both the trustee and the financial services third party.
The question then arises whether the beneficiary will be bound by the arbitration
clause.
In cases such as this, the beneficiary will invariably argue that she should not
be bound by the agreement to arbitrate because she was not a signatory to it. The
majority of courts addressing this issue have decided that the beneficiary can be
bound by the trustee‟s signature.57
Courts have addressed beneficiary challenges to arbitration clauses in this
context with a variety of responses. There is, of course, an underlying principle that

52. Id. at 355 (citing Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 589-90 (Tex. 2008)).
53. Id. at 355-57.
54. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.401 (West 2010). The Florida statute provides:
(1) A provision in a will or trust requiring the arbitration of disputes, other than disputes of
the validity of all or a part of a will or trust, between or among the beneficiaries and a
fiduciary under the will or trust, or any combination of such persons or entities, is
enforceable.
(2) Unless otherwise specified in the will or trust, a will or trust provision requiring
arbitration shall be presumed to require binding arbitration under s. 44.104.
Id.
55. Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Making Arbitration Truly Mandatory, TR. & EST. 22,
22 (Jul. 2008). The authors state:
Mandatory arbitration is often good for everyone involved in a trust dispute. Grantors are
assured that their private lives remain out of the courts and therefore free from public
exposure. Trustees can protect trust assets, while limiting their liability, thus reducing the
overall cost of trust administration. Beneficiaries can avoid the emotional damage and cost
of protracted litigation. And the public doesn‟t have to fund a legal process in which the
wealthy battle over their trust funds.
Id.
56. See generally Alan Scott Rau, Evidence and Discovery in American Arbitration: The Problem of
“Third Parties,” 19 AM. REV. INT‟L ARB. 1 (2008) (discussing the many issues that arise when third
parties are involved in arbitration disputes).
57. See, e.g., Baker v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. B193400, 2008 WL 223776, at *6 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2008) (finding that the trustee of a trust had the power to bind beneficiaries to an
arbitration agreement); Merrill Lynch v. Eddings, 838 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Tex. App. 1992) (“We hold that
the settlor and beneficiaries of a trust are bound by a clause in an account agreement to arbitrate the
claims arising out of transactions in the trust‟s account.”).
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only parties who voluntarily agree to binding arbitration should be forced to
arbitrate claims. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this general
principle.
First, the court may find that the beneficiary is equitably estopped from
resisting arbitration.
Second, the court may hold that because the agreement containing the
arbitration clause is the source of the beneficiary‟s claim, the beneficiary can be
compelled to arbitrate. This was the reasoning underlying the decision of the Court
of Appeals of Washington in In re the Jean F. Gardner Amended Blind Trust.58 In
Gardner, a trust beneficiary sued both the trustee and a securities broker with
whom the trustee contracted.59 The contract included a provision agreeing to
arbitrate all disputes arising under the agreement. 60 The court concluded that all of
the beneficiary‟s claims arose under the agreement and, therefore, the beneficiary
was bound to the arbitration agreement.61
However, some courts disagree on this issue. In Clark v. Clark,62 a case
raising a virtually identical issue, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals came to the
opposite result.63 Here, the trust beneficiary was held to not be bound by the
agreement‟s arbitration clause.64 In contrast to Gardner, the court in Clark
determined that the beneficiary‟s case arose independent of the agreement, and that
the trustee was not an agent of the beneficiary.65 Since the beneficiary had not been
a party to the initial agreement to arbitrate, the court held that he could not be said
to have waived his constitutional right to access the courts.66
Third, the court may hold that the beneficiary is a third-party beneficiary of
the contract between the trustee and the contracting party and, therefore, is bound
by the terms of an arbitration agreement contained in the contract. This rationale
was used by the Court of Appeals in Arizona in Shahan v. Staley.67 Shahan is an
interesting case in that it arose when the trust beneficiary was attempting to compel
the trust‟s securities broker to arbitrate.68 The broker resisted, arguing that the
beneficiary was not his customer.69 The court concluded that the beneficiary was
entitled as a third-party beneficiary to the arbitration he sought. 70
Some courts, however, have declined to use the third-party beneficiary
doctrine to enforce arbitration clauses against a trust beneficiary. In Morgan

58. 70 P.3d 168 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 169.
61. Id. at 170. The Texas Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Merrill Lynch v.
Eddings. The Eddings court noted “[i]f the settlor and beneficiaries of a trust could bring suit
independently of the trustee and thereby avoid the arbitration agreement, the strong state policy favoring
arbitration would be effectively thwarted.” Eddings, 838 S.W.2d at 879. In Eddings, the trial court had
denied the motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 876.
62. 57 P.3d 95 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 99.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 932 P.2d 1345 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
68. Id. at 1347.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1348.
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Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday,71 a Florida appeals court considered a suit by a trust
beneficiary against a trustee and a brokerage firm with which the trustee had
contracted.72 The beneficiary alleged mismanagement of the trust assets.73 When
the trustee placed trust assets with Morgan Stanley, the trustee signed a customer
agreement that included a binding pre-dispute arbitration provision. 74 After the
beneficiary filed suit, Morgan Stanley moved to compel arbitration on the theory
that the beneficiary was a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between the
trustee and Morgan Stanley that contained the arbitration provision and that the
beneficiary was bound under agency theory. 75 Rejecting the third-party beneficiary
theory, the court held simply that the beneficiary was not an intended beneficiary of
the customer agreement, nor was she, in particular, an intended beneficiary of the
arbitration provision.76 Citing the often-used statement that incidental or
consequential benefit is insufficient to render one a third-party beneficiary, the
court affirmed the trial court‟s denial of Morgan Stanley‟s motion. 77 Further, the
court noted that Morgan Stanley also seemed to be arguing that the trustee was an
agent of the beneficiary who could bind the beneficiary to the arbitration
agreement.78 The court rejected this argument as well, stating that the trustee is a
fiduciary of, not an agent for, the beneficiary. 79 In conclusion, the court cogently
stated:
As for arbitration agreements, which involve a waiver of a person‟s
right of access to the courts, binding a non-signatory to arbitrate
under the theory of third party beneficiary is fraught with
miscalculation and unfairness. For one thing, unless a manifestation
of intent by the third party beneficiary to the arbitration clause is
clear and indisputable, the non-party‟s right of access may be lost by
the unilateral decision of another without knowledge or consent. For
another, it is difficult to understand how, as a general matter, the
usual arbitration agreement is designed specifically to benefit a nonparty. In this instance, any general doubt as to benefit is displaced by
its specific absence, as the trial Judge found. Arbitration in this
case—involving the alleged mismanagement by both Morgan
Stanley and the Trustees of the Trust assets—will not shorten the
71. 873 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
72. Id. at 402.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. As further evidence of the creative lengths to which parties seeking to arbitrate will go,
Morgan Stanley argued that the fact that the beneficiary had a personal account covered by an agreement
containing a binding pre-dispute clause suggested that she should be bound by the similar clause in the
agreement between the trustee and Morgan Stanley. The court rejected this argument. Id. at 402 n.1
(citing Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Lifshutz, 595 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
76. Halliday, 873 So. 2d at 403.
77. Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985); Caretta Trucking Inc.
v. Cheoy Lee Shipyards, Ltd., 647 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
78. Id.
79. Id. (“That the Trustees may engage the services of an expert in managing Trust assets to assist
them in the performance of their fiduciary responsibilities hardly makes them agents of the Trust
beneficiary in order to bind her personally to their hiring of that assistance or to their purported waiver
of her right of access to a court to seek redress for loss occasioned thereby.”).
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dispute at all because the litigation will proceed against the Trustees
anyway.80

If the court decides that this sort of claim must be submitted to arbitration, an
interesting question arises: who is the proper party to the arbitration, the trustee or
the beneficiary? The New York case of In re Blumenkrantz81 is one of the very few
cases addressing this issue.82 Typically, the trustee is the only person with authority
to act on behalf of the trust. 83 In a case in which the beneficiary is suing both the
trustee and the contracting third party, however, the trustee is squarely in a conflict
of interest position.84 In these situations, courts allow the beneficiary to sue on a
theory analogous to the derivative suit in the corporate setting. 85 This rationale,
however, also makes the beneficiary subject to the arbitration agreement entered
into by the original trustee.86
c. Trends
As the case law illustrates, arbitration issues involving trustees are somewhat
different from other arbitration cases in the sense that the settlor, who is
presumably competent and acting knowingly and voluntarily, is agreeing on behalf
of the trust beneficiaries to arbitrate possible future disputes between the
beneficiaries and the trustee. The element of vulnerability, if present, would be in
the beneficiary standing on the receiving end of one of the most respected fiduciary
duties in the legal spectrum.
As the case law further illustrates, some courts have difficulty applying
traditional contract law rules governing the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate
in the trust setting.87
There is no question that using arbitration in the trust context has a number of
possible advantages over litigation. If a trust dispute is between family members,
having the matter resolved more quickly than it would be through litigation
improves the chance that the family‟s relations will improve after the dispute.
There may also be a desired privacy in the arbitration process that would not be
present in a litigation context.88
80. Id. at 404.
81. 824 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2006).
82. Id. at 887-88.
83. Id. at 888.
84. Id. (“The trustee cannot be held liable for failure to oversee management of the funds absent a
determination by the arbitrator that Wachovia Securities is liable to the trust for the loss incurred. It is
not in the interest of the trustee to pursue a claim against Wachovia Securities. A finding of misfeasance
against Wachovia could result in a finding of liability against the trustee for failure to properly monitor
the delegee . . . .”).
85. See id. at 889 (holding that the proper procedure is to grant the beneficiary limited trusteeship
for the purposes of proceeding against the contracting party).
86. Id.
87. See Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A Powerful
Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, But Are They Enforceable?, 42 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 351, 361-64 (2007) (discussing courts‟ difficulties in applying contract law to the
enforceability of arbitration clauses in trust settings).
88. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Reducing Estate and Trust Litigation Through Disclosure, In
Terrorem Clauses, Mediation and Arbitration, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 237, 261 (2008) (noting
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On the other hand, those who suffer breaches of a fiduciary duty owed to them
have traditionally had recourse to the courts. Forcing a trust beneficiary to arbitrate
against either a trustee or one with whom the trustee has contracted is antithetical to
this idea.
With respect to arbitration based on a contract between the trustee and a third
party, the Florida Court deciding Halliday may have summed it up best: “Perhaps
the whole idea of trying to bind a nonparty trust beneficiary to an arbitration
agreement entered into by the Trustees with a securities portfolio manager is really
what is wrong here.”89 The court went on to discuss that it seems wrong to allow a
fiduciary to delegate an important aspect of its duty to the trust and its beneficiaries
to a third party, and then have the third party attempt to force the beneficiary into
arbitration while the trustee stands by. 90
With respect to arbitration between a trustee and beneficiary, the argument
seems even stronger. One who owes a fiduciary duty to another should not be able
to force the other party to arbitrate. In taking that position, nothing would prevent
the beneficiary and trustee from agreeing to arbitrate after a dispute has arisen.
Rather, the difficulty is with arbitration clauses that mandate arbitration before a
dispute has arisen.
III. ANALYSIS
The growing number of courts addressing pre-dispute binding arbitration
agreements suggests two things. First, an increasing number of challenges are being
made to such agreements. Second, some courts seem to be struggling to find ways
to refuse to enforce such agreements, suggesting a growing discomfort with the
agreements themselves.
In response to the first point, some make the argument that the issue stems
from an excess of lawyers pursuing frivolous lawsuits. These individuals see the
entire issue as emanating from the greed of plaintiff-side trial lawyers.
It is not surprising that so many of these challenges arise in situations
involving vulnerable individuals. If there are concerns in the context of consumer
versus entity,91 those concerns would be magnified when an element of
vulnerability is added.92
The trust situation may present the strongest example of situational
vulnerability. The trust beneficiary may be a capable, intelligent, strong individual.
However, that same individual may be vulnerable with regards to the trust. The
vulnerability in that setting comes from the fact that the beneficiary is owed one of

that litigation often leads to adverse publicity among families). Attorney Blattmachr suggests an
interesting twist to a traditional mandatory arbitration clause: combine the clause with an in terrorem
model to state that the beneficiary who refuses to mediate or arbitrate in good faith forfeits his interest.
Id. at 260-61.
89. Halliday, 873 So. 2d at 403.
90. Id. at 404.
91. See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 3, at 1640-42 (describing the unique
features and concerns of consumer arbitration).
92. See id. at 1641 (noting that “less educated” persons can be covered by arbitration, which means
that fewer consumers understand the clauses to which they agree).
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the strongest fiduciary duties in law: that of trustee to beneficiary. 93
In response to the second point, the lengths to which some courts will go to
find a way to refuse to enforce an arbitration clause suggests to this author that
courts are increasingly uncomfortable with enforcing mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in the consumer context. It makes sense that this discomfort
would be at its greatest when one of the parties to the arbitration is in a vulnerable
position.
The best example of this may be the courts that have used contractual
unconscionability as a way to refuse to compel arbitration. Unconscionability is
viewed by many as a safety valve in the law of contracts. 94 It can be used by courts
when faced with an otherwise valid contract that the court does not think should be
enforced.
To this author, unconscionability is seldom desirable as a theory for deciding a
case. Based as it is on whether the issue at hand shocks the conscience of the court,
use of the doctrine leads to divergent results in situations involving substantially
similar facts.
Further, it is important to note that even though most of the recent decisions
uphold the arbitration agreement, many of the decisions reverse trial courts that
refused to compel arbitration. 95 This suggests a discomfort at the trial court level
about compelling arbitration in these cases.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Federal Arbitration Act was
enacted “to overrule the judiciary‟s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to
arbitrate.”96 Although Supreme Court precedent suggests a willingness to accede to
congressional intent, state courts seem more reluctant. The resulting patchwork of
state court precedent has led to uncertainty and contradictory results in similar
cases. Even if two courts enforce arbitration agreements, different reasoning
underlying the enforcement can lead to uncertainty as to what theory will work in
the next case.
CONCLUSION
The time has come for an intense consideration of whether binding pre-dispute
arbitration involving consumers is desirable. In light of the sweeping coverage of
the Federal Arbitration Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the optimal
vehicle for altering the enforceability of binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements
involving consumers is reconsideration of the Federal Arbitration Act by Congress.
Commentators have called for precisely such action, 97 and this author adds her
93. See, e.g., 1 MARK L. ASCHER ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 2.1.5 (5th ed. 2006)
(“[The characteristics of a fiduciary relationship] exist in a particularly intense way in the relationship
between trustee and beneficiary.”).
94. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration:
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 609 (2009) (discussing the intersection
of unconscionability doctrine and arbitration).
95. See, e.g., Eddings, 838 S.W.2d at 876 (reversing the trial court‟s order denying a motion to
compel arbitration).
96. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
97. See generally ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 1 (providing a collection of essays by
various scholars, which call for changes to American arbitration law).
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